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PALERMO v. UNITED STATES
Jencks Act Construed
Palermo v. United States'

The defendant was tried on a charge of wilfully attempting to evade payment of federal income taxes. Prior
to the trial in the District Court, the government interrogated a witness for approximately three and one-half hours,
and a short memorandum of approximately six hundred
words had been made by a federal agent as a summary of
what had been revealed during the interrogation. At the
trial defendant demanded and was given transcripts of
the entire testimony of the witness during this interrogation, as well as a later affidavit. Defendant's request for
a copy of the six hundred word memorandum was refused by the trial judge on the ground that the document
requested was not within the scope of Section (e) of the
Jencks Act.2 Defendant was convicted and the conviction
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.' Certiorari was granted to determine the
scope of the statute.4 The Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that the refusal to
require production of the six hundred word summary was
justified under the Jencks Act and affirmed the decisions
in the courts below. Justices Brennan, Black, Douglas, and
the Chief Justice joined in a concurring opinion that acknowledged the propriety of the result but criticized the
majority for their full examination of the scope of the
statute that was not, in their opinion, required by the
case at bar.5
The decision in Palermo indicates that the Court does
not intend to require the complete revelation of government investigative dossiers upon the defendant's motion in
a federal criminal proceeding. Instead, the Court has
adopted the rather narrow limitations of the Jencks Act as
the only applicable rule to be used in determining whether
or not to require the production of statements made by
government witnesses. What is of considerable interest is
the fact that the majority have put their holding on purely
procedural grounds, thereby denying that the constitu'360 U.S. 343 (1959).
118 U.S.C.A. (1960 ,Supp.) § 3500.
8258 F. 2d 397 (2nd Cir. 1958).
'358 U.S. 905 (1958).
5Supra, n. 1, 360.
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tionally guaranteed rights of defendants have been impinged upon by the adoption of this rule.0
By upholding the restrictive Jencks Act provisions,
the Court tempers the effect of their liberal decision in
Jencks v. United States7 and allays the fears of those who
saw in that decision a broad and dangerous precedent under which the secrecy surrounding government investigative files would be eroded with a resultant decrease in the
effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies.
In the Jencks case, the Court ordered a new trial for
the officer of a union who had been convicted for filing a
false non-Communist affidavit. The grounds were that it was
error for the trial court to deny the defendant access to
reports filed by a government witness solely because the
defendant had not laid a preliminary foundation of inconsistency between the contents of the report and the
witness's testimony. The Court held that reports previously filed with the F.B.I. by witnesses which touched
upon activities or events about which these witnesses
testified were required to be produced for the defendant's
scrutiny, without their first being submitted to the trial
judge for his decision as to their relevancy, regardless of
the detrimental effect of the revelation of secret material
concerning the national security program. The Palermo
decision makes it clear that the more liberal procedures
prescribed in Jencks were not based upon due process or
other constitutional grounds, but were the Court's interpretation of what the then applicable procedural rules required.
Congressional reaction to the Jencks decision had been
swift and severe, taking the form of outspoken. criticism
coupled with the introduction of hastily drawn bills in
both the House and the Senate designed to ameliorate or
entirely nullify the effect of the Court's pronouncement,
by erecting barriers against too broad incursions into
government 'files.' In, a flurry of activity marking the
closing weeks of the first session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress, the slightly different versions of the House and
6Supra,

n. 1, 373.
7353 U.S. 657 (1957). For a discussion of the Jencks case and the resulting Jencks Act, see The Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 Stanford L. Rev.
297 (1959) ; and Comment. The Impact of Jencks v. United States And
Subsequent Legislation On The Secrecy Of Grand Jury Minutes, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 244 (1958).
8 Eleven Bills were introduced in the House alone, 103 Cong. Rec. 8327
(1957), while the Senate concerned itself with debating and amending a
bill drawn by the Justice Department and introduced In the Senate by
Senator O'Mahoney, 103 Cong. Rec. 10057 (1957).
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Senate were sent to a conference committee, where a
compromise measure was drawn, reported out, and
promptly passed by both houses. That due process considerations were a topic of congressional concern pending
the enactment of the Jencks Act, as Mr. Justice Brennan,
indicates, may be ascertained from the report of the conference committee and the Congressional Record. ° The
same sources will also reflect, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for the majority, contends, the determination of
the framers of the statute to sharply limit access to government files and to make the statute the only rule under
which statements of government witnesses are to be obtained."
The Jencks Act provides that no statements are required to be produced by the government until after the
witness who made them has testified on direct examination. The trial judge must then decide on the relevancy of
disputed documents; and if it is found that they are relevant, the defendant is allowed access only to the relevant
portions of them.'2 The heart of the Jencks Act is Section
(e), wherein the material producible under it is defined.
That Section limits production to written statements signed
or approved by the witness and "stenographic, mechanical,
electrical or other recording, or a transcription thereof,
which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the government
and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such
statement."
In two other cases decided the same day as the Palermo
case, Rosenberg v. United States 3 and Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 4 the Court announced further
interpretations of the Jencks Act. In Rosenberg the Court
held that a letter from a government witness to the
federal agent in charge of the case, in which the witness
requested a chance to read over her testimony in a
previous trial prior to testifying again, was producible
under the statute; but that failure to require its production was not reversible error due to the fact that the
9
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1861, 1862
(1957).
10 103 Cong. Rec. 15928, 15933, 16489 (1957).

11Justice Frankfurter, in two appendices to Palermo, supra, n. 1, 356, 358,
outlines the legislative history of the Jencks Act to illustrate the intent of
Congress in passing it.
12 18 U.S.C.A. (1960 Supp.) § 3500.
18360 U.S. 367 (1959).
,360 U.S. 395 (1959).
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substance of the letter was revealed by the witness during
her testimony.
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Court held that grand
jury minutes were not producible under the Jencks Act,
but were to be produced only where the trial judge
might, at his discretion, find that in fairness to the parties
the veil of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings
should be lifted. In each of these cases, the four justices
who concurred specially in Palermo, joined in a dissenting
opinion.
As an examination of past decisions of the Supreme
Court will show, some of the provisions of the Jencks Act
are not without precedent while others are in direct conflict with previous holdings. In Goldman v. United States,5
the Court established the rule that memoranda made by
government agents or a witness were producible at the
trial judge's discretion when the witness did not use notes
when testifying during the trial. Gordon v. United States,"
and later Jencks, broadened the Goldman decision. The
Gordon case held that it need only appear that the evidence
sought was relevant, competent, and outside any exclusionary rule, to require its production; 7 and Jencks held
that the document need only touch upon or relate to the
events and activities at the trial, the defendant not being
required to show inconsistencies prior to obtaining it.' s
The Court in Jencks also ruled against the practice of
submitting documents to the trial judge for his decision
as to their relevancy before giving access to the defendant. 9
The requirement that all government documents bearing any relation to the testimony of a witness be produced
-316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942). Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority,
denied that the defendant should have access prior to the trial to the
memoranda, consisting mostly of a digest of overheard conversations.
36344 U.S. 414 (1953).
"'Ibid. A Government witness had made several statements to the authorities which did not implicate the defendants and a later one which did.
When the witness testified at the trial only the last incriminating statement was used and the trial judge refused to require production of the
exculpatory statements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any
relevant statements should be produced for examination by the trial judge
as to their admissibility, and that failure to require such production was
prejudicial
error.
18 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 666 (1957). Cf. Gordon v. United
States, supra,n. 16, where the prior foundation had been laid by the defendant. The Jencks opinion distinguishes the cases by stating that the holding In Gordon was not based on the fact that foundation had been laid.
' 9 Jencks v. United States, supra, n. 18, 669. The Court required the documents be first examined by defendant before the trial judge passed on
their admissibility.
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for the defendant's examination has very obvious shortcomings. The danger of revealing complete dossiers of
classified materials before a ruling is made on their materiality would preclude prosecution of all but the most
important defendants. The government would, in effect,
be required to balance the importance of the connected
materials in its investigative files from a security aspect
as against the desirability of obtaining a conviction against
the defendant at hand. This balancing of interests, however, is precisely what Justice Brennan prescribed in
2"
Jencks.
The Palermo decision, then, is a conservative retrogression from Jencks, not denying that relevant statements of witnesses may be produced but endorsing the
Jencks Act safeguards against what Mr. Justice Jackson in
Gordon v. United States described as a "broad or blind
fishing expedition among documents possessed by the
government on the chance that something impeaching
might turn up."'" Under the Palermo decision, statements
not producible under the Jencks Act are not producible
at all.
No one can gainsay that there is a valid and worthwhile
interest to be served by the erection of adequate safeguards around the investigative process. How far this
can be carried without eroding personal rights of defendants in criminal prosecutions based upon such investigations is the crux of the Jencks Act conflict. In certain
areas, security interests and personal rights: are simply
incompatible. Legislative enactments can never wholly
satisfy both requirements. There is no panacea that will
itself resolve problems by simple cataloguing of what is
and what is not producible. The Jencks Act provisions,
if strictly applied under the Palermo holding, could lead
to the forced exclusion of valid, relevant material solely
on the basis of its form where digesting of testimony had
been practiced. On the other hand, the Jencks decision,
liberally construed in the lower federal courts, brought
materials under the scrutiny of defense counsel without
regard to relevancy or competency, often with deleterious
effects on the investigative program.2 2
20Supra,
1

2

n. 18, 672.

Supra, n.16, 419.

2This
problem and others arising from Palermo, are discussed in a
Recent Case, Production of Statements - Statute Governing Production

Ruled Exclusive Vehicle For Production By The Government, 108 U. of Pa.

L. Rev. 141 (1959).
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The federal courts, under the Palermo decision, will
be required to employ the highest level of judicial prudence in passing upon materials for production purposes
without doing violence to either of the conflicting considerations. The underlying purpose of the Jencks Act
must be given weight in arriving at such a decision. Simply defined, the statute is intended to limit production to
relevant materials for use only in cross-examination. of
government witnesses. Statements or other materials not
suitable for cross-examination use because they touch
neither the matter at issue nor the character or veracity of
the witness should, therefore, not -be ordered produced.
The Jencks Act requirement that the statements only be
produced after the witness has testified on direct examination is -firm basis for the exclusion of fragmentary or
extensively digested materials.
The liberal justices, Warren, Black, Douglas, and
Brennan, who dissented as a group in Rosenberg and Pittsburgh and who concurred specially in Palermo, seem to
feel that the Jencks Act, as construed by the majority,
does reach a substantial constitutional barrier when it is
allowed to limit so severely the types of government held
materials available to a defendant. Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring in Palermo, argues that the serious limitations
imposed by the majority's interpretation of the statute
conflict with the right of a defendant to be confronted with
his accusers and obtain witnesses in his behalf as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 23 He concedes that the
decision in Jencks "was not put on constitutional grounds,"
but points out that the overriding considerations of constitutional guarantees were "close to the surface" in that
decision and that Congress recognized their import during
24
the debate over the enactment of the Jencks statute.
The stand of the liberals might be stated as acknowledging
the power of Congress to prescribe rules for the administration of justice in the federal courts within constitutional limits, but that the construction placed on the Jencks
Act by the majority, making documents not producible
under it not producible at all, puts it beyond the bounds of
constitutionality. The concurring justices, then, would not
2 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362 (1959) ("Less substantial
restrictions than this of the common-law rights of confrontation of one's
accusers have been struck down by this Court under the Sixth Amendment.
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47. And in such circumstances, there becomes pertinent the command of that Amendment that criminal defendants
have compulsory process to obtain witnesses for their defense. See United
States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. .Supp. 731, 738.").
1,Palermo v. United States, 8upra, n. 23, 362-3.
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have attempted to define the limits of the statute as the
majority did, but would have only decided that the Jencks
Act precludes the trial court from requiring the production of the specific summarization as demanded by the
defendant in the instant case.
The instant case, adopting as it does the restrictive
provisions of the Jencks Act and complying with the
expression of conservative congressional feeling that it
embodies, marks a victory for those who fear the liberal
tendencies of judicial law-making and who feel more secure with the rules of procedure explicitly defined by
legislative enactment. Others, who see in such restrictive
laws the strangulation of personal rights and liberties,
align themselves with the concurring justices against the
interpretation placed on the statute by the majority.
Perhaps, as the concurring justices propose, it would be
better to allow the lower federal courts time to apply the
Act's provisions in a variety of situations and let the
Supreme Court restrict itself to interpreting only so much
of it as the cases before it demand, rather than essay a
complete definition on first impression especially when
personal rights are involved. It will be of interest to
follow subsequent decisions to determine whether the
all-embracing scope the Court ascribes to the Jencks Act
in Palermo will continue to meet the needs of security in
,government files while protecting the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of defendants as well.
DAVID L. BowEns

